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ANNUAL SURVEY OF TENNESSEE LAW
Agency-1963 Tennessee Survey
John S. Beasley II*
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I. AGENT oR INDEPENDENT CoNm~TcroR?
The Union Carbide and Ferguson1 cases were suits to recover Ten-
nessee sales taxes and use taxes paid under protest for 1956 and 1958.
Carbide and Ferguson urged that since they were under contract to the
Atomic Energy Commission, the legal incidence of the tax was on the
United States directly and therefore invalid. Carbide had been se-
cured in 1943 to manage and operate certain plants involved in work
on the atomic bomb, and Ferguson had subsequently been engaged to
build additional facilities for this purpose. Both contended that their
relationship with the United States and the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion was one of agency, and that they were therefore within the im-
plied immunity of the United States from state tax.
2
In characterizing the nature of the relationship the court considered
the fact that Carbide and Ferguson both hired and fired their own em-
ployees, and administered their own contracts. The AEC did, it is
true, retain approval of certain employees and the right to require
*Associate Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. United States v. Boyd, 211 Tenn. 139, 363 S.W.2d 193 (1962), af'd, 32 Law Week
4503 (U.S. Sup. Ct. June 15, 1964). The cases were actually filed by Union Carbide
Corporation and H. K. Ferguson Company, the Government joining as a co-complainant.
2. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), upheld a sales tax levied
on a contractor doing work for the Government on the theory that doing work for the
Government did not of itself make the contractor an instrumentality of the United States
and thus immune from state tax. In Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941),
the Court sustained a similar tax on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contractor even though the
economic burden of the tax would fall on the United States. The test announced in
that case was one of "legal incidence," a tax paid by the United States indirectly being
valid where a direct tax on the Government was not. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
authorized payments by the Commission in lieu of taxes, placing the AEC on sub-
stantially the same footing as other Government agencies with respect to such taxation.
Thus a state tax levied on an independent contractor would be a valid tax, while one
levied on an agent of the Government would be invalid under the Government's im-
munity.
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dismissal within limits.3 In Carbide's case the AEC also controlled
the amount of materials to be processed and the type of research work
to be done. With Ferguson the AEC handled architectural and en-
gineering work, and controlled scheduling of jobs. Nevertheless, in
their overall operations, the Supreme Court of Tennessee found both
companies to be independent contractors, and therefore subject to the
use tax levied. The court recognized the type and number of controls
which the AEC retained and employed, but said in its holding:
It is, however, the nature of the controls which determine their effect. Our
examination of the record indicates that many of the controls enumerated by
the appellants are nothing more than specifications for the 'end result.' Others
are necessitated by the monopoly in atomic development and the duty to
regulate the use of nuclear raw materials vested in the A.E.C.; the need for
maximum security; the need for coordination of the Oak Ridge Operation
with other A.E.C. projects, and the need for strict accounting for the use of
public funds. These factors dictate extensive controls, yet within the frame-
work of these controls the contractors remain independent in the sense that
they are free to utilize their own experience and initiative in achieving the
objectives or in the result of the Commission. In fact, the A.E.C. lacks the
man power and facilities to perform these functions, and it is for this reason
it entered into the contracts in question.4
In their purchasing functions, however, both Carbide and Ferguson
were found by the court to be agents of the Government. The court
recognized that the word "agent" did not appear in purchase orders or
contracts, but gave great weight to the fact that purchases were made
on behalf of the Government, payment was made from Government
funds, and title was taken directly by the Government. In holding the
relationship here to be one of agency, the court said: "The mere
placing of terms such as agent or independent contractor in the con-
tract does not make them such in law. The surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances determine the relationship."5 This being true, the sales tax
was a direct charge against the Government, and therefore invalid.6
3. In another recent case the Supreme Court of Tennessee stated the test between
an independent contractor and an employee to be whether there was a right to control
the person in doing the work, and a right to terminate the employment. "Such right
is incompatible with full control of the work which is usually enjoyed by an-independ-
ent contractor." Owens v. Turner, 211 Tenn. 121, 124, 362 S.W.2d 793, 794 (1962).
4. 211 Tenn. at 158-59, 363 S.W.2d at 201.
5. Id. at 155, 363 S.W.2d at 200.
6. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954), involved Arkansas sales
tax levied on the vendor of diesel equipment. Contractors were building an ammuni-
tion depot for the Government, and in the purchase orders for equipment it was provid-
ed that title should pass directly to the Government. The Court gave emphasis to the
form of the contracts and purchase orders, tending to regard as immaterial any motive
to avoid state taxation.
AGENCY
II. AGENCY AND THE "JOINT VENTURE"
In Howard v. Dewey Motor Co.,7 negligence of the driver of an auto-
mobile was imputed to an injured occupant of the car in an action
against a third party on the basis of "joint venture." Both plaintiff-
occupant and driver were automobile salesmen, employees of Chuck
Hutton Motor Company. In accordance with practice, plaintiff asked
Johnson, the driver, to help him appraise a prospective customer's
automobile for trade. During the course of the drive the collision
occurred with a car driven by defendant's employee. The trial court
found both drivers negligent, and barred plaintiffs recovery against
the third party.
There are numerous Tennessee cases recognizing that contributory
negligence of a driver will be imputed to an occupant where the two
are on a joint venture. The theory is one of agency, "each of the
parties is the agent of the other.. . each is entitled to direct the other
in the prosecution of the common enterprise."8 Joint enterprise, as a
defense, is applicable only as regards third parties, not between the
parties to the enterprise, a distinction recently drawn in Archie v.
YatesY
The real question is: What is a joint enterprise? There was no joint
enterprise where six people drove in a car from place to place, drink-
ing, dancing, and carousing from dusk until dawn in accordance with
a prearranged plan, then collided with another car.10 In arriving at a
test in that case, the court said: "There must not only be a community
of interest in the objects or purposes of the undertaking, but also an
equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each
other with respect thereto."" A dissent in this case points out the wis-
dom of leaving the question of the existence of a joint enterprise to
the jury.
12
The trial court in the instant case found a joint enterprise as a mat-
ter of law and this was upheld on appeal.
Whether we consider the salesman, Johnson, the agent of plaintiff Howard
or the agent of Chuck Hutton Motor Company, or agent of both, plaintiff,
7. 50 Tenn. App. 631, 363 S.W.2d 206 (1961).
8. Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 591, 280 S.W. 32, 33 (1925).
9. 205 Tenn. 29, 325 S.W.2d 519 (1959).
10. Berryman v. Dilworth, 178 Tenn. 566, 160 S.W.2d 899 (1942); accord, Logwood
v. Nelson, 35 Tenn. App. 639, 250 S.W.2d 582 (1952).
11. Id. at 573, 160 S.W.2d at 902.
12. "The question of whether persons riding in an automobile are engaged in a joint
enterprise so that the negligence of the driver will be imputed to the occupants, is a
question for the jury, where there exists a conflict in the evidence on the question of
whether the occupants were guests, or were engaged in a common enterprise, or where,
from the undisputed evidence, different conclusions might be drawn from the evidence
on this question." Id. at 576-77, 160 S.W.2d at 903.
1964]
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as bailee of his customer's automobile at the time of the accident, bad a
right of control of the automobile equal to or superior to that of the salesman
Johnson.13
III. AGENT'S LILBiLnTY TO A Tnm PARTY
A. Where the Principal is Disclosed
Triolo v. Treadwell & Harry Inc.14 leaves this writer puzzled. Mrs.
Triolo moved a house onto her land in Shelby County. She called an
employee of defendant insurance agency, with whom she had dealt
before, told him the house had just been moved and that she planned
extensive repair work on it before she would move in, and asked him
to insure it against fire. On November 18, 1959, Maryland Casualty
Company issued its policy providing coverage in the amount of three-
thousand dollars for a period of five years. The policy contained a
provision against the company's liability in the event the house was
vacant and unoccupied for a period of sixty consecutive days, and this
policy was sent to the mortgagee of the property. The memorandum
of insurance which Mrs. Triolo received did not contain a statement
concerning the occupancy warranty. About the time of the first anni-
versary, defendant's employee called Mrs. Triolo and advised her to
raise the limits of the policy to four-thousand dollars, which she did on
November 18, 1960. On January 15, 1961 the house was destroyed by
fire.'
5
In a suit against it as principal, Maryland Casualty successfully set
up the sixty day occupancy provision as a defense against liability,
though Mrs. Triolo claimed that she had in fact occupied the house by
spending nearly every weekend there. Because electric, gas, and water
connections had not been made, the chancellor ruled that such occa-
sional occupancy did not constitute occupancy within the meaning of
the policy.
The case was not appealed, but instead this suit was brought against
defendant insurance agency, the theory being that defendant had
breached its duty to provide Mrs. Triolo with insurance which would
cover her. Since the house had been ruled unoccupied for the purposes
of the policy, she contended that defendant's employee knew the
house was unoccupied and would remain so, and that defendant was
charged with this knowledge. The chancellor, in finding for defendant,
held that defendant's knowledge that the house was vacant was not
necessarily knowledge that it would remain so for more than sixty
13. Howard v. Dewey, supra note 7, at 637, 363 S.W.2d at 208.
14. 371 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
15. It is interesting to note that the fire occurred within sixty days of the transaction
on November 18, 1960, at which time the limits of the policy were raised. Apparently
no contention was made that a new contract had come into existence on that day, with
new consideration and new terms.
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AGENCY
days.16 On appeal to the court of appeals the judgment was affirmed,
the court affirming also a finding that complainant had not shown
prejudice to her cause resulting from the discrepancy in the memoran-
dum of insurance sent her.
17
The court went on to rule for defendant on another ground, saying
that if complainant could prove the agent's knowledge that the house
would remain vacant for more than sixty days, she should have done so
in the suit against Maryland. On this issue the chancellor had re-
fused to rule. Unfortunately, the appellate court cited no authority
for this holding, though one wonders if it could be collateral estop-
pel18 or res judicata.19
B. Where the Principal is Undisclosed
Where an agent acts for an undisclosed principal in executing a con-
tract with a third party, may the agent be held individually? Spark-
man v. Phillips20 follows a long line of Tennessee cases holding that
he may, even where the principal is subsequently disclosed, though the
third party will be compelled to elect which of the two he will hold.
The case involved interesting facts, though not from an agency
standpoint. Sparkman, a minor, inherited a house and lot encumbered
by a trust deed. On April 17, 1961, by next friend he sued for an in-
junction against foreclosure and for the appointment of a manager, and
in the alternative for sale of the property for his interest. On April
19 an offer to buy the property was submitted to Phillips, trustee under
the trust deed, by Title Guaranty and Trust Co., Trustee, signed by its
president. The offer was to remain open ninety days, and the sum in-
volved was fourteen-thousand dollars. For whom Title Guaranty was
"Trustee" was not disclosed. On April 28 the court granted the injunc-
tion and appointed Phillips manager of the property.
Shortly thereafter the principal decided to withdraw the offer, which
information was imparted to the chancellor informally by Title Guar-
anty's president over lunch. The chancellor at that time advised him
that it would be necessary to petition the court to withdraw the offer.
Instead of doing so, however, he procured the removal of the written
offer from Phillips.
16. McCaleb v. American Ins. Co., 205 Tenn. 1, 325 S.W.2d 274 (1959), held that
if there was in fact an expectation on the agent's part that the house would continue
to be vacant for more than sixty days, this knowledge would be imputed to the principal
and the provision against liability in the policy would be deemed waived.
17. The prejudice seems obvious to this writer. Through the action of the agent,
complainant was kept unaware of a provision of the policy which could very likely,
under the circumstances, be material; indeed, it was not only material but decisive.
18. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 6 (1942).
19. This can often be the case in the master-servant relationship. See MECHEM , OUTr-
LINES OF AGENCY 404-46 (4th ed. 1952).
20. 371 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
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Thereafter in June the court learned that the offer had been so with-
drawn and ordered it re-submitted in order that it might be accepted.
V/hen it was received by the court it had been altered to disclose the
principal, and words had been added indicating that it had been with-
drawn.21 The court confirmed the sale to the agent, having Title
Guaranty before it as a quasi-party. 22 The court of appeals modified
the holding so as to permit Title Guaranty to file its answer and cross
bill, and to join the principal in the suit.
The third party's right to hold either the agent or the undisclosed
principal was recognized in Tennessee as far back as 1868.23 It has
been so held even where the third party who was aware of the iden-
tity of the undisclosed principal extended credit to the agent on ac-
count of the principal.24 Sler v. Perkins set the outer limit of the
doctrine by holding the agent of an undisclosed principal liable unless"it affirmatively appears that it was the mutual intention of the parties
to the contract that the agent should not be bound."25
21. On the instrument appeared these words: "June 26, 1961. This offer was made
in behalf of Dr. J. E. Kimball and withdrawn upon his order. He does not desire to
make the offer at this time. The court asked that this copy be filed by Title Guaranty &
Trust Co., Trustee and such offer is tendered only because of such order of the court.
(signed) Title Guaranty & Trust Co. Trustee for Dr. J. E. Kimball by C. 0. Hon, Jr.,
Pres." Id. at 163.
22. The court of appeals affirmed the chancellor's holding that, having submitted an
offer in this kind of situation, the offeror was before the court as a quasi party. See
Matthews v. Eslinger, 41 Tenn. App. 116, 292 S.W.2d 543 (E.S. 1955).
23. Davis v. McKinney, 46 Tenn. 15 (1868).
24. Bass v. William Gerst Brewing Co., 2 Tenn. Civ. App. 639 (1912).
25. 126 Tenn. 380, at 387, 149 S.W. 1060, at 1061 (1912).
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